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Social Democracy, Democracy and Capitalism

Abstract

This article argues that the belief in democratic accountability was a core belief of early social democracy in the nineteenth century. After exploring how early social democracy understood itself largely as a democracy movement, the article will explain the turn away from democracy that was associated above all with the adoption of Marxism. The article will proceed to trace the torturous path of social democracy back to endorsing democracy as a key aim through the interwar economic and political crisis to the post-Second World War years, when the Cold War made it paramount for social democracy to shed its Marxist legacies and make democracy a key plank of its own identity again. However, as this article will argue, other planks were those of macro-economic planning, social engineering, and state welfare, and it was those that were at the centre of critiques formulated by neoliberalism and by a postmaterial left from the 1970s onwards. The cultural hegemony of neoliberalism in particular led to a deep crisis of social democracy which is ongoing, but, as we shall see, it is interesting to observe that in various attempt to reinvent social democracy, ideas of democracy all take centre stage.

Keywords: *Marxism, democracy, economic democracy, social democracy, planning, welfare, postmaterialism, neoliberalism.*

David Marquand, the long-term British social democrat, Labour MP, and left-wing intellectual wrote the following about the relationship between democracy, capitalism, and social democracy: "Either democracy has to be tamed for the sake of capitalism, or capitalism has to be tamed for the sake of democracy. The capitalist market economy is a marvellous servant, but for democrats it is an oppressive, even vicious master. The task is to return it to the servitude which the builders of the postwar mixed economy imposed on it, and from which it has now escaped."[1] According to Marquand, this was the task of social democracy. He made this statement a few years after he had re-joined the Labour Party in 1995 which he had left together with his long-term

1 David Marquand, "Premature Obsequies: Social Democracy Comes in from the Cold," in *The New Social Democracy*, edited by Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 14–5.

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political mentor, Roy Jenkins, in 1981 to protest the left-wing drift of the party in the late 1970s. The statement puts in a nutshell the belief of many social democrats that the economy should be subject to democratic checks and balances. As we shall argue below, the belief in democratic accountability was a core belief of early social democracy in the nineteenth century. After exploring how early social democracy understood itself largely as a democracy movement, the article will explain the turn away from democracy that was associated above all with the adoption of Marxism. Marxism was not hostile to democracy, quite the contrary, but democracy stopped being an aim in itself. Hence it had a functional value for Marxists on the road to the establishment of the communist society. The article will proceed to trace the torturous path of social democracy back to endorsing democracy as a key aim through the interwar economic and political crisis to the post-Second World War years, when the Cold War made it paramount for social democracy to shed its Marxist legacies and make democracy a key plank of its own identity again. However, as this article will argue, other planks were those of macro-economic planning, social engineering, and state welfare, and it was those that were at the centre of critiques formulated by neoliberalism and by a postmaterial left from the 1970s onwards. The cultural hegemony of neoliberalism in particular led to a deep crisis of social democracy which is ongoing, but, as we shall see, it is interesting to observe that in various attempt to reinvent social democracy, ideas of democracy all take centre stage. Hence the article will highlight the importance of understanding the social democratic project as a project for democratizing not only the political sphere but also wide areas of society and the economy.

Democracy as a Way of Fighting Economic, Social and Political Exclusion: The Beginnings of Social Democracy in the Nineteenth Century

The emergence of industrial capitalism from the late eighteenth century onwards, first in Great Britain, subsequently in Europe, the Americas and elsewhere in the world, brought with it new ways of labouring and living that were associated with dangerous factory work, long working hours and poor living conditions. Friedrich Engels described these new ways of living and working in his classic *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, first published in 1845, that was based on his experiences in the shock city of the industrial revolution, Manchester.[2] The workers who were living

2 On the process of working-class formation, see Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

this new life began to form associations to defend themselves against the power of the factory owners, and to ask for a fairer share in their economic profits. The formation of trade unions was the most direct expression of the desire of workers to fight for their economic inclusion by way of higher wages, better and safer working conditions, and shorter working hours.[3] Producer and consumer cooperatives were other types of organization meant to ensure more economic and social inclusion for ordinary working people by cutting out the profits made by middlemen, merchants and industrialists.[4] As most working people did not have the right to vote in the nineteenth century, political parties were founded to fight for workers' enfranchisement and their representation in parliament, where their MPs worked for the adoption of laws that benefited working people, from accident insurance to pensions to insurance against sickness and health and safety laws.[5] Social democratic trade unions, cooperatives and parties were all aimed at increasing the democratic participation of working people in the economic, social and political life of the state. Many early socialists saw their aims as inextricably intertwined. Thus, Louis Blanc argued that only a democratically elected parliament would bring about, through legislation, the setting up of independent producers' cooperatives.[6] Working-class associations often did not organize the poorest of the poor, but rather artisans, small trades people and journeymen. Many of them were directly threatened by the new industrial capitalism and they also possessed the necessary educational and cultural resources to set up these organizations. Most of the early social democratic organizations were small by comparison with liberal, conservative, or church organizations, and they tended to be characterized by attempts to build up their own democratic associational life within their organizations.[7]

Connecting their belief in democracy with their desire for greater social justice, they called their type of political commitment social democracy. They were opposed to monarchical, aristocratic and clerical rule, but they were also opposed to those liberals who wanted to link political empowerment to education and property. Early

3 E. P. Thompson in his classic *The Making of the English Working Class*, first published in 1963, described that process of early trade union formation in the industrializing regions of Britain, where John Gast of the London skilled trades, Gravener Henson for outworkers in northern England and John Doherty for the cotton spinners led British trade unionism to its first highpoint in the late 1820s and early 1830s.

4 Mary Hilson and Silke Neunsinger, eds., *A Global History of Consumer Cooperation since 1850: Movements and Businesses* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

5 On the early political formation of working people see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62–84.

6 Joachim Höppner and Waltraud Seidel-Höppner, *Von Babeuf bis Blanqui. Französischer Sozialismus und Kommunismus vor Marx* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1975), vol. 1, 301.

7 For early German social democracy this has been analysed in exemplary fashion by Thomas Welskopp, *Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz* (Bonn: J. W. H. Dietz Nachf., 2000).

social democracy was to all intents and purposes a citizens' movement, intent on making workers into citizens who could participate in the affairs of the economy, society, and the state. They fought for political, social, cultural, and economic inclusion of workers, and yet they often experienced exclusion. Politically, they were disenfranchised. Early political parties, such as the German Social Democratic Workers' Party, the SDAP, hence put franchise reform at the heart of their political programmes: "political freedom is the most indispensable precondition for the economic emancipation of the working classes. Hence the social question is indivisible from the political question. The solution of the former is conditional on the solution of the latter, and possible only in the democratic state."[8] Socially, they were not accepted by their social superiors. The bourgeoisie developed sophisticated mechanisms of distinction to keep workers before the gates of middle-class associationalism. Workers were, strictly speaking, not clubbable in the social spheres of the middle classes. Workers aspired to education, but often found that they could not pay for the expensive higher schools that were the gateways to universities. Culturally, workers were keen to develop their own cultural forms: choir singing, concerts, literature, and theatre. Social democracy also shared an interest in middle-class cultural icons, even if they were prone to interpreting those icons differently. A telling example is the commitment of early German social democracy to Friedrich Schiller, the national poet of Germany, who social democrats interpreted in significantly different ways to many of his more middle-class admirers. For social democrats he was the poet of liberty and democracy and of a nation characterized by those values.[9] Economically, workers and their organizations, the trade unions, were often fought bitterly by the employers who wanted to retain their absolutist rights inside the factory gates and refused any demands to negotiate with those seeking to represent their workers independently. Overall then, the culture of early nineteenth-century social democracy was made up of frustrated aspirations of working men. It should indeed be stressed that it was an altogether male associational culture that we are talking about. The political language of manliness created its own exclusions, against women from their own social milieu. Even if some of the early socialists, like François-Charles Fourier, were champions of women's emancipation, even if some of the classic texts of social democracy, such as August Bebel's *Women and Socialism*, first published in German in 1879 and translated into dozens of languages, call for the extension of women's rights, social democratic associational culture often

8 Dieter Dowe, *Programmatische Dokumente der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, (Berlin: J.W.H. Dietz Nachf., 1984), 2nd edn., 174.

9 Martin Rector, "Sozialdemokratische Literatur von 1890–1918," in *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, edited by Victor Žmegač (Weinheim: Beltz, 1996), vol. II:1, 4th edn., 234–55.

remained male-centred.[10] However, it was the comprehensive exclusion of the male social democratic milieu at all levels of industrial society that ultimately would turn many social democrats into hostile critics of the entire social system that they came to identify with and name as "capitalism."

Marxism and Anti-Capitalism

Nothing exemplified this turn of social democracy from a commitment to democratic inclusion to anti-capitalism more than its adoption of Marxism during the last third of the nineteenth century. The more social democracy was politically oppressed and excluded the more it adopted the language of anti-capitalist revolution that it took from the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx and Engels valued democracy, for it was on the basis of democracy that the bourgeoisie would ultimately be defeated, but they also differentiated clearly between bourgeois and proletarian democracy.[11] The former was a formal mechanism of middle-class interest representation, whereas the latter started from the social content of democracy and was far more participatory. Indeed, the Paris Commune of 1871 was to become a model for Marx and Engels in terms of the outlook of a genuine proletarian democracy. Rather misleadingly, Marx called this proletarian democracy a "dictatorship of the proletariat," as it was based on the interests of the working class. Hence the context and content of democracy was different, but the mechanism of democratic rule would stay in place. However, Marx never thought through what a proletarian democracy would look like in practice which added to the confusion over the term "dictatorship of the proletariat."[12]

It is characteristic that the largest social democratic movement of the world before 1914, German social democracy, adopted Marxism formally and made it a cornerstone of its political programme after 12 years of political persecution under the so-called Anti-Socialist Laws between 1878 and 1890. In its Erfurt Programme of 1891, the party committed itself to Marxism and the overthrow of capitalism and its ruling classes. The class struggle, the social democrats now argued, was the motor of social change and would eventually result in a revolution that was to sweep away the old

10 On Fourier see Pamela Pilbeam, *French Socialists Before Marx: Workers, Women and the Social Question in France* (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 2000). For the interwar period see also Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves, eds., *Women and Socialism. Socialism and Women. Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998).

11 Alex Demirovic, "Marx und die Aporien der Demokratietheorie," *Das Argument* 30 (1988): 847–60.

12 Uwe-Jens Heuer, "Demokratie/ Diktatur des Proletariats," in *Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug (Berlin: Argument Verlag, 1995), vol. 2, 534–51.

order and bring about socialism as the dawn of a new era in which the working classes would be liberated and in which they would rule.[13] The esteem in which German social democracy was held in Europe and the Americas ensured that this message of revolutionary anti-capitalism associated with Marxism circulated widely and wherever social democracy experienced economic, social, cultural and political exclusion it also resonated widely.[14] It never was the only show in town, as anarchism, more particularly anarcho-syndicalism, was a rival but equally anti-capitalist and revolutionary force that was in parts of southern and south-eastern Europe and in Latin America a more powerful political movement than social democracy.[15] Christian, mainly Catholic workers' movements had their own critique of capitalism which they saw as incompatible with the teachings of Christ, even if they were often hoping for a moral reform of capitalism rather than its violent overthrow.[16]

The close connection between the exclusionary practices directed against social democracy and the latter's turn to revolutionary anti-capitalist Marxism is indirectly confirmed by the different path travelled by social democracy in Britain, where a powerful trade union movement had emerged in the nineteenth century capable of enforcing their recognition by employers. Allied to the Liberal Party after mid-century, it achieved political recognition and representation in parliament, where many trade unionists turned MPs influenced legislation. "Respectable" trade unionism was socially accepted by middle-class society, even if the class lines in British society remained incredibly distinct.[17] Transferring its allegiances to the nascent Labour Party after the 1900s the trade union movement also ensured that the Labour Party never became an avowedly Marxist party. Committed to "parliamentary socialism"[18] it sought the democratic inclusion of the working class into the British nation state.[19] Whilst it contained Marxist and anti-capitalist sentiments at certain times and places,

13 Stefan Berger, *Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany* (London: Longman, 2000), 72–6.

14 J. P. Nettl, "The German Social Democratic Party 1890–1914 as a Political Model," *Past and Present* 30 (1965), 65–95.

15 Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams, eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019).

16 Lex Heerma van Voss, Patrick Pasture, and Jan de Maeyer, eds., *Between Cross and Class: Comparative Histories of Christian Labour in Europe, 1840–2000* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005).

17 Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Selina Todd, *The People. The Rise and Fall of the Working Class* (London: John Murray, 2014).

18 Ralph Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961).

19 Erich Wangermann, "Vom vernünftigen System zur Logik der ökonomischen Entwicklung. Zur Demokratiediskussion in der englischen und deutschen Arbeiterbewegung," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 3 (1991), 53–71.

it always remained committed a predominantly reformist version of social democracy.[20]

It would, however, be entirely mistaken to ignore the emergence of reformism also within the social democratic movements officially dedicated to revolutionary anti-capitalism. After all, the first part of the Erfurt programme of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), making official the party's conversion to Marxism, was already balanced with a second part, which described in detail the reformist aspirations of the party in a variety of different policy fields. Before the First World War Eduard Bernstein became the most outspoken representative of reformism within German social democracy, calling for a democratic and parliamentary road to socialism that would seek alliances with other politically progressive forces in Germany.[21] Whilst his brand of "revisionism" was condemned by the party leadership and the keeper of its ideological grail, Karl Kautsky, incidentally a personal friend of Bernstein, many leading social democrats increasingly practiced reformism in their political life in Imperial Germany. And even Kautsky shared with Bernstein a firm commitment to representative forms of democracy.[22] Well before 1914 reformism became a strong movement in virtually all social democratic parties in Europe and elsewhere, even where they were officially committed to Marxism. Hence pre-First World War social democracy was characterized by a deep split between those who felt that the only road to socialism would be the one through a violent overthrow of capitalism and those who favoured a parliamentary and evolutionary road to socialism.[23] Whilst many of the former became disciples of communism after the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the latter formed to backbone of social democratic movements in the interwar period.

However, the Marxist legacy in social democracy had left a deeply ambiguous attitude of many social democrats vis-à-vis democracy. Many associated liberal democracy in particular with capitalism and condemned it as a political system in which the full emancipation of the workers would not be possible. Marx and Engels themselves had been deeply ambiguous about liberal democracy. On the one hand they recognized that its freedoms and rights-based discourse was an advantage for working-class activism when compared to autocratic and absolutist forms of government. On the other hand, they depicted liberal democracy as class rule of the bourgeoisie that could only be ended by a violent overthrow of the economic system, capitalism, that liberal democracy was associated with. Hence, within the social democratic movement of the

20 Andrew Thorpe, *A History of the British Labour Party* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997).

21 Manfred B. Steger, *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

22 Karl Kautsky, *Der Parlamentarismus, die Volksgesetzgebung und die Sozialdemokratie* (Stuttgart: J.H.W. Dietz, 1893).

23 Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1955).

pre-First World War era, an intense discussion took place about varieties of democracy, including socialist or proletarian democracy and how they could be distinguished from one another.[24]

Searching for a Democratic Path towards Socialism

It was the Bolsheviks and Lenin in particular who forced this debate after 1917, and in the ideological rifts between Lenin and Kautsky, two lines of socialism were established which both had a profound impact on the course of the twentieth century. Lenin's "proletarian democracy" that legitimated an end of parliamentary rule and a form of dictatorship of the most advanced parts of the working class, i. e. the Communist Party, stood diametrically opposed to Kautsky's "social democracy" that accepted the frame of liberal parliamentary democracy in order to advance the causes of social justice.[25] In the interwar period social democracy was to embark on alliance-building with other socially progressive forces in order to win parliamentary majorities, form national governments and implement social reforms often seen as the first steps to a comprehensive social democratization of societies. The most important social democratic party of the pre-1914 period, the German SPD, was hampered in its efforts by the emergence of the biggest communist party outside of the Soviet Union in Germany and a distinct lack of powerful and willing political allies that shared its democratic and social inclinations. It was nevertheless able to give the Weimar Republic nationally and many of the states of Weimar, notably Prussia, a distinctly social democratic outlook—with significant advances in trade union rights, social welfare and workers' social, cultural and educational inclusion into the state.[26] Yet arguably the more significant advances were made in Sweden, where the social democrats forged a lasting alliance with the farmers' party that laid the foundation for half a century of social democratic rule that was to shape Swedish society deeply and made Sweden a byword for social democracy in many parts of the world.[27] By merging a socially progressive agenda of workers' inclusion with the language of nation and community—Per Al-

24 An attempt to systematize this discussion in a scholarly way can already be found in Artur Rosenberg, *Democracy and Socialism: A Contribution to the Political History of the Past 150 Years* (New York: Beacon Press, 1965). [first published in German in 1938]

25 Moira Donald, *Marxism and Revolution: Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists, 1900–1924* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

26 Heinrich August Winkler, *Geschichte der Arbeiter und der Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik*, 3 vols. (Bonn: J.W.H. Dietz, 1984–1987).

27 Jenny Jansson, *Manufacturing Consensus: The Making of the Reformist Swedish Working Class* (Philadelphia: Coronet, 2012); see also: James Fulcher, "Sweden," in *The Force of Labour. The Western European Labour Movement and the Working Class in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Stefan Berger and David Broughton (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 7–38.

bin Hanson's "folkhemmet," the Swedish SAP achieved an unprecedented cultural hegemony in Swedish society that still is hugely influential if by no means undisputed anymore in Sweden today. In Italy the Socialist Party under Antonio Labriola also followed a policy of a step-by-step extension of democracy and social reform.[28] Already well before 1914 the French socialist leader Jean Jaurès had declared his firm belief in gradual reform under parliamentary democratic auspices.[29] In the interwar period it appeared for a while as if social democratic parties would best be able to combine concerns for liberal democracy with concerns for social justice.[30]

In the interwar period many social democrats attempted to put forward ideas that would extend democracy from the political to the economic sphere. Fritz Naphtali, the head of the German social democratic trade unions' Research Institute for Economic Affairs developed an elaborate theory of economic democracy between 1925 and 1929. Extending the powers of works councils and establishing management boards in which unions would be directly represented as well as state involvement in economic decision-making were all important elements in this theory.[31] Much less dependent on state intervention and statism was guild socialism, but at the heart of this idea was also the notion of economic democracy.[32] Whitney councils in Britain after 1918 signalled a renewed interest in questions of economic democracy as did the Dutch socialists' demands for significant workers' participation in management.[33]

Returning social democracy in the interwar period to the democratic path of the search for inclusion from where it had started in the early nineteenth century and from which it had deviated under the impression of multiple exclusions in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was not without its difficulties. The most important were the ongoing economic crises of the interwar years, associated with hyperinflation and especially with the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Not only for the communists but also for many social democrats the economic failure of capitalism seemed to confirm again how deeply problematical this economic system was and how it impacted negatively on the values and interests of social democracy. Hence it also prompted the return of greater anti-capitalist sentiments in the ranks of social democracy. Even in the relatively reformist Britain, Labour Party politicians

28 Luigi dal Pane, *Antonio Labriola nella politica e nella cultura italiana* (Turin: Enaudi, 1975).

29 Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth and Dissolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), vol. 2, 178ff.

30 Sheri Berman, *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

31 John Moses, "The Concept of Economic Democracy within the German Socialist Trade Unions During the Weimar Republic," *Labor History* 34 (1978), 45–57.

32 Kevin Morgan, *Bolshevism, Syndicalism and the General Strike: The Lost Internationalist World of A. A. Purcell* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2013).

33 Lex Heerma van Voss, "The Netherlands," in *The Force of Labour*, edited by Stefan Berger and David Broughton (Washington, DC: Berg, 1995), 50.

such as Harold Laski feared for parliamentary socialism in the 1930s and despaired of the prospect of bringing about socialism through constitutional means.[34] When the shadow of fascism darkened the prospect of a social democratic future in the 1930s and when more and more democracies fell for authoritarian forms of government, the few remaining liberal democracies had to face the question whether they were a dying creed. The Bataille Socialiste in France and the Action Socialiste in Belgium both sought to commit social democracy to a course of revolutionary anti-capitalism in alliance with communism. When Austro-fascism came to power in Vienna in 1934, Otto Bauer abandoned his earlier endorsement of the democratic road to socialism and instead called for revolutionary action leading to a dictatorship of the proletariat.[35]

Whilst some social democrats thus turned to anti-capitalism, this situation tied other social democrats even further to liberal democracy and led them to a deeper engagement with theories of pluralism. Thus, for example, Gustav Radbruch and Hermann Heller in Germany began to argue that interest fragmentation was the basis of pluralist policies that would not go away in socialist societies. Hence, they argued as legal experts that the maintenance of the rule of law would be the prime concern for social democrats even after a socialist society had been created, as individual rights would protect different interests and their expression.[36] The experience of exile, especially in Western democracies, such as Britain and the United States, enhanced and promoted a deeper understanding of democratic pluralism and led to an endorsement of liberal democracy as the frame in which social democratic politics had to seek to advance its agenda.[37] No one represented that change more than the later West-German social democratic chancellor, Willy Brandt. As a young social democrat Brandt had joined the breakaway Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) in 1932 that aimed to transcend

34 Harold Laski, *The Crisis and the Constitution: 1931 and After* (London: Hogarth Press, 1932); Laski, *Can Socialism Come by Constitutional Methods* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932).

35 On the revival of revolutionary Marxism in social democratic parties in Europe during the first half of the 1930s see Gerd Rainer Horn, *European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency in the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

36 Hermann Heller, "Staat, Nation und Sozialdemokratie," (1925), in *Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by Hermann Heller (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1971), 527–42; Gustav Radbruch, *Der innere Weg. Aufriss meines Lebens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 131.

37 Isabel Tombs, "Socialists Debate Their History from the First World War to the Third Reich: German Exiles and the British Labour Party," in *Historikerdialoge: Geschichte, Mythos und Gedächtnis im deutsch-britischen kulturellen Austausch 1750–2000*, edited by Stefan Berger, Peter Lamber and Peter Schumann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 361–82; Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003); Ursula Bitzegeio, *Über Partei- und Landesgrenzen hinaus: Hans Gottfurcht (1896–1982) und die gewerkschaftliche Organisation der Angestellten* (Bonn: J.W.H. Dietz Nachf., 2009).

the SPD's purely legalistic defence of political democracy in Weimar Germany. Socialized in the Social Democratic Youth Movement (SAJ) in the 1920s Brandt would have been familiar with one of the most famous slogans of the SAJ: "Democracy that is not much, Socialism is the aim." (It rhymes in German: Demokratie, das ist nicht viel, Sozialismus ist das Ziel.) The word "democracy" was sometimes exchanged for the word "republic." Both variants, however, show to what extent the democratic commitment of younger social democrats could not be taken for granted. In exile in Norway, Brandt came under the spell of Scandinavian, in particular Swedish social democracy. Here he learnt to understand political democracy as the only foundation on which socialism could be built after the end of the Second World War, and, inversely, he came to comprehend socialism as "perfect democracy."[38]

Welfare Capitalism and Social Democracy

The end of the Second World War, which had brought so much devastation to Europe, provided one of the rare moments of temporary instability, where horizons of expectations were suddenly wide open and demands for change were widespread. Antifascist councils or liberation councils stepped into a power vacuum and sought to implement social, economic, and political reforms. The future of capitalism, widely associated with fascism, especially in fascist countries, such as Italy and Germany, or countries where capitalist elites had collaborated with the fascist occupiers, such as France, seemed in doubt. Social and economic elites were challenged and threatened, and the political vacuum at the heart of many immediate postwar societies produced all sorts of schemes, some of them pregnant with ideas of anti-capitalism. [39]

Under the impact of the global Cold War the dichotomy between social democracy and communism, established after 1917, became more marked. Social Democracy equalled high treason in Stalinist communism and was punishable by death sentences. Social democratic anti-communism in liberal capitalist societies contributed to multiple discriminations, persecutions and to the depiction of communists in rather two-dimensional ways. An ongoing commitment to Marxism that would form a shared platform with communists now became untenable. It was once again the German social democratic party that embarked on the most symbolic purging of Marxism, in its emblematic 1959 Bad Godesberg programme.[40] Wholly committed

38 Willy Brandt, *Links und frei. Mein Weg, 1930–1950* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1981).

39 Stefan Berger and Marcel Boldorf, eds., *Social Movements and the Change of Economic Elites in Europe after 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018).

40 On the significance of the Bad Godesberg programme see Peter Lösche and Franz Walter, *Die SPD: Klassenpartei, Volkspartei, Quotenpartei – zur Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie*

to liberal democracy, social democracy now made its peace with capitalism, no longer seeking to overcome and replace it but instead attempting to bring about a capitalism with a human face, in other words a capitalism that would provide benefits also for workers, in particular welfare and the mass consumption of consumer goods as well as greater equality of opportunities in education.[41] In his comparison of the postwar trajectories of the Dutch, French and German social democratic parties, Dietrich Orlow concluded that "virtually all Socialists insisted political democracy was an end in itself. The concept included both respect for individual civil rights and adherence to a system of political decision-making founded on free, universal suffrage. Most social democrats favoured parliamentary democracy as a constitutional system."[42] The Socialist International in 1951 underlined the symbiotic relationship between democracy and social justice: "Socialism can only be realized through democracy; democracy can only be perfected through socialism."[43] And just before the end of the Cold War, in 1989, it reiterated its belief that democratic socialism consisted of the "worldwide democratization of economic, social and political power structures."[44]

Where social democracy was strong it often built on and institutionalized liberal corporatist arrangements, which allowed macro-economic steering of processes in which employers and trade unions were closely integrated. In its Scandinavian version it might have resembled a "politics against markets,"[45] but it also often would be more correctly described as a politics with markets, as those in political power had to accept the rule of the game that was still capitalism. Attempts at steering the economy were accompanied by efforts to increase forms of workplace democracy. Different types of workplace democracy can be distinguished.[46] One of the oldest, already promoted by Beatrice and Sidney Webb in the 1890s,[47] is that of industrial democracy, i. e. trade union representation of workers and collective bargaining procedures.[48] Next to

von Weimar bis zur deutschen Vereinigung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992).

41 Gary Dorrien, *Social Democracy in the Making: Political and Religious Roots of European Socialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), chapter 6, 409–74.

42 Dietrich Orlow, *Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French and German Social Democratic Parties 1945–1969* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

43 "Ziele und Aufgaben des demokratischen Sozialismus" [1951], in *Geschichte der Internationale*, edited by Julius Braunthal (Hannover: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1971), vol. 3, 613–4.

44 Prinzipienerklärung der sozialistischen Internationale, 17th Congress, Stockholm, 1989, 3.

45 Gøsta Esping Anderson, *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

46 Stefan Berger, Ludger Pries and Manfred Wannöffel, eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of Workers' Participation at Plant Level, Basingstoke* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2019).

47 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy* (London: George Allen & Co., 1892).

48 John W. Budd, *Employment with a Human Face: Balancing Efficiency, Equity and Voice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

this there was also the idea of self-management and workers' control, which included power-sharing mechanisms between workers and management at plant level.[49] Thirdly, various forms of representation of workers in management boards were implemented. The best-known of those representative models of workplace democracy is that of German codetermination (Mitbestimmung).[50] A fourth type of workplace democracy focused on the lived experiences at work highlighting diverse mechanisms through which work could become an emancipatory and participatory experience. An emphasis on workplace organization is here related to opportunities for self-determination and democratic decision-making.[51] A fifth type of workplace democracy focusses on questions of ownership and promotes diverse forms of mutualism. Cooperatives are the best-known form of this bottom-up associations for economic purposes, where the producers also own the means of production and share the profits as well as the losses.[52] A variant of this type is private ownership of firms which allow representation of consumers, stakeholders, and users of products on management boards.[53] Finally, we have industrial citizenship models, where workers are financially rewarded if the company does well. In other words, they share to different degrees in the company's profits.[54] A comparative history of these types of workplace democracy and their relationship to the social democratic project after the Second World War is yet to be undertaken.[55]

Furthermore, the social democratic arrangement with capitalism led to comprehensive plans of social engineering, where the state apparatus was to be used to achieve greater equality of opportunities and more social justice. Thus, for example, school reforms were implemented that were meant to make higher forms of schooling more porous for working-class children allowing them more access to education, including

49 James Muldoon, *Council Democracy: Towards a Democratic Socialist Politics* (London: Routledge, 2018).

50 Walther Müller-Jentsch, *Mitbestimmung: Arbeitnehmerrechte im Betrieb und Unternehmen* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019).

51 Andrea Veltmann, *Meaningful Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

52 Vera Zamagni, "A Worldwide Historical Perspective on Cooperatives and their Evolution," in *The Oxford Handbook of Mutual, Cooperative and Co-Owned Business*, edited by Jonathan Michie, Joseph Blasi and Carlo Borzaga (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 97–113.

53 Christopher D. Merrett and Norman Walzer, eds., *Cooperatives and Local Development: Theory and Applications for the 21st Century* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

54 Erik Poutsma, John Hendrickx, and Fred Huijgen, "Employee Participation in Europe: in Search of the Participative Workplace," *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 24:1 (2003), 45–76.

55 In 2021, the author, together with Roberto Frega, Frank Georgii and Manfred Wannöffel, initiated a DFG/ANR-funded project with the aim to provide such comparisons for Western Europe. Many thanks to Roberto, Frank, and Manfred for intense discussions on workplace democracy that will surely intensify further in the years to come.

higher education. Other schemes of social engineering included the public financing and the paying of subsidies for cultural, educational and leisure facilities that would allow everyone, including workers, to participate in cultural, sports and other recreational activities. The traditional belief of the left in science and progress furthered an outlook according to which a rational planning of the social by scientific elites would best ensure the realization of a progressive agenda towards more social equality.[56]

During the long economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s it appeared, at least in Western Europe, as if the social democratic model of welfare capitalism would drive everything before it. Liberal, Christian democratic and even conservative parties social democratized themselves and joined in the chorus of those seeking to use democracy in order to harness capitalism to work for the benefit of everyone in society, including workers.[57] Welfare capitalism became a West European model in these decades, carefully studied and observed and sometimes even copied or adapted in other parts of the world. The global system conflict between capitalism and communism made that model attractive, as it was capable of underpinning the claim that communism was not the best way of achieving social justice and a fair deal for workers. Social democracy was able to ride the tiger of capitalism in a way that would ultimately achieve better living and working conditions, higher standards of living, more mass consumption and greater equality of opportunities also for those sectors of the population for whom communism allegedly spoke.[58] German workers, for example, voted with their feet until the sealing of the German-German border in 1961 and, by leaving the Communist East Germany in droves, gave expression to their belief that they trusted welfare capitalism more than communism in building a worthwhile future for themselves.[59]

56 In model countries of social democracy, like Sweden and Norway, social engineering constitutes a core platform of social democratic governmental policies. See Francis Sejersted, *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

57 On the social democratisation of western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s see Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1945* (London: Penguin, 1994), chap. 9: 'The Golden Years'.

58 Alexander Hicks, *Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

59 On workers in the GDR, see Christoph Klessmann, *Arbeiter im 'Arbeiterstaat' DDR: deutsche Traditionen, sowjetisches Modell, westdeutsches Magnetfeld (1945–1971)* (Bonn: J.W.H. Dietz Nachf., 2007).

The Neoliberalization of Social Democracy

Yet this social democratic vision of democratizing capitalism and making it work for all came under severe pressure in the economic crisis of the 1970s ending the long postwar boom and ushering in forms of economic crisis management among which the rise of neoliberalism promised the most radical break with the social democratic postwar project. Neoliberal policies, associated above all with the governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US during the 1980s, attacked many of the core assumptions of social democratic welfare capitalism.[60] Macro-economic steering, its apostles argued, crippled the dynamism and energy of free markets, prevented economic growth and was thus indirectly a job killer. Hence everything had to be removed that prevented markets from operating without outside interference. Employers had to be as free as possible to take decisions that were in line with market mechanisms. The "dead hand"[61] of the state had to be removed and the power of trade unions to interfere with managerial decisions had to be reduced. The civil war from above that was waged by Thatcher on the British trade unions with the full force of the state behind her was the most telling example of the neoliberal aspiration to crush everything that stood in the way of market deregulation.[62]

Yet the attack of neoliberalism on social democratic welfare capitalism was not only directed against the macro-economic steering of markets, but also on all forms of social engineering that was associated by neoliberals with waste of taxpayers' money and endless state bureaucracy stifling freedom and individual initiative. It allegedly produced forms of welfare dependency that made whole generations of workers into passive recipients of state monies rather than active shapers of their own destinies. Neoliberals pointed out not only how wasteful the state handouts had been but also how comparatively minor the results were, in terms of (for example) making working-class children access higher education and in changing the class structure of society.[63]

Finally, neoliberals replaced the social democratic buzzword "democracy" with the neoliberal buzzword "freedom." Both capitalism and individuals had to be freed from the incompetent, paternalistic and wasteful interferences of the state who had not so

60 Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2015). See also Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

61 Brink Lindsey, *Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism* (New York: John Wiley, 2002).

62 Peter Dorey, "Margaret Thatcher's Taming of the Trade Unions," in *The Legacy of Margaret Thatcher: Liberty Regained?*, edited by Stanislao Pugliese (London: Politico, 2003), 129–151.

63 William Roth, *The Assault on Social Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

much democratized as bureaucratized markets and everyday lives of ordinary people. The attempts of social democracy to expand notions of democracy from the political sphere of representation via elections and parliaments to other spheres of life, including the economic and social spheres, were rolled back and notions of a more restrictive liberal democracy, restricted to the political process, were revived by neoliberal politicians and theoreticians. One of the canonical texts for neoliberals, Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*, first published in 1962, stressed the aspects of freedom rather than democracy in underpinning capitalism.[64]

The economic and social record of neoliberalism is at best mixed and at worst catastrophic. Deindustrialization in the UK and the US devastated whole industrial regions and coined phrases such as "rust-belt" and "chavs," associated with dislocation and the disintegration of social ties that once underpinned whole working-class communities. Neoliberalism widened the gulf between the "haves" and the "have nots." It made the rich richer and the poor poorer. And yet it thrived on the fears of the middle classes who did not want to pay higher taxes and who could not see benefits for themselves in social democratic welfare capitalism. And it also thrived on the promises to the working classes that they, through thrift and hard work, could achieve more individually than collectively through bodies such as trade unions, cooperatives, and social democratic parties. In other words, despite a doubtful social and economic record it managed to achieve forms of cultural hegemony that had a deep impact on the social democratic project of democratizing capitalism.[65]

It should be noted here that the neoliberal attacks on the social democratic project were accompanied by attacks from an anti-authoritarian left that had its origins in the 1968 movement.[66] Building on some of its theoretical inspirations, in particular the writings of Max Horkheimer, it had come to mistrust the traditional statism of social democracy and the accompanying attempts at social engineering.[67] Under the impact of the new environmental thinking, associated with the writings of the Club of Rome but also with the green movements of the 1970s, a fundamental critique of Western ideas of progress as being at the heart of an unsustainable and destructive process that destroyed the foundations of human life on earth came to fore from the 1970s onwards. Ideas of sustainability, communitarianism, "small is beautiful" and the power of civil society all had a critical edge towards traditional social democratic beliefs in

64 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

65 Wendy Brown, *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).

66 Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring, eds., *Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

67 Max Horkheimer, *Gesellschaft im Übergang* (Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp, 1981).

social engineering, statism, and progress.[68] Hence it was not only the neoliberal right but also a post-1968 new left that came to doubt the social democratic project of the immediate postwar decades.

Under this double impact social democrats came to doubt their own project and began rethinking their basic beliefs in ways that moved them in some ways closer to neoliberalism. They bought into the neoliberal belief in the freedom of markets and shied away from regulating the economy. They became less interested in redistributing wealth and were no longer worried by the rich getting richer. They also mistrusted their earlier attempts at social engineering and instead now bought into the language of neoliberalism, propagating more active forms of citizenship and self-help rather than welfare. An active stakeholder society and the mobilization of citizens was to provide ways out of the paternalist social engineering projects of the past.[69] Some scholars, such as Gerassimos Moschonas, went as far as arguing that social democratic parties, under the influence of neoliberalism, had undergone a "great transformation" that made them act "in the name of social democracy" but without the values and ideals that once underpinned the social democratic project.[70]

The neoliberalization of social democracy always had its limits. Thus, budgets of social democratic governments in the 1990s and 2000s remained mildly redistributive throughout. There was an ongoing concern with poverty and preventing people from being trapped in poverty. Equally, social democrats looked for ways of managing deindustrialization rather than leaving everything to markets, even if these forms of deindustrialization were now even more than before hardly ever directed against markets but sought to bolster capitalism through state measures. The state was still used in positive ways by social democrats to underpin notions of solidarity with working-class communities suffering under the impact of deindustrialization.[71] It would also be wrong to equate ideas about stakeholder societies and the mobilization of citizenship initiatives automatically with neoliberalism. Anthony Giddens' ideas about a "third" social democratic way, published in the 1990s, were about giving some of the neo-

68 Jeffrey C. Alexander and Piotr Sztompka, eds., *Rethinking Progress: Movements, Forces and Ideas at the End of the Twentieth Century* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

69 Magnus Ryner, "Neoliberalisation of European Social Democracy: Transmissions and Dispositions," in *The Sage Handbook of Neoliberalism*, edited by Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings, and David Primrose (London: Sage, 2018), 248–59.

70 Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002).

71 Matthieu Fulla and Mark Lazar, "European Socialists and the State: A Comparative and Transnational Approach," in *European Socialists and the State in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries* edited by Fulla and Lazar (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020), 1–26.

liberal ideas around individual initiative and freedom a distinctly social democratic outlook.[72]

Nevertheless, the neoliberalization of social democracy went far enough to ensure that social democracy lost its distinctive political brand with which it had been associated before the 1980s. Political parties began to appear to the left of social democracy often championing programmes that looked suspiciously like old social democratic ones advocating more steering of the economy, more social engineering and more democratization of capitalism.[73] Right-wing populist parties appeared who often attempted to cloth themselves in social garb, i. e. they also promised a return to welfarism, albeit often under ethnocentric, nationalist and racist preconditions.[74] And the Christian democratic traditions at the centre of politics that had been social democratized in the 1950s and 1960s often remained a serious political rival for social democratic parties.[75] Hence the social democrats were squeezed from all sides and in many countries lost their status as catch-all parties becoming at present a mere shadow of their former political selves. This has gone furthest in those countries where the neoliberalization of social democracy has gone furthest, in particular in the Netherlands, Britain and Germany, but social democratic parties have also been losing ground in their Scandinavian heartlands and elsewhere. During the last years many of the parties have attempted to revert their association with neoliberalism and return to more traditional social democratic agendas and concerns but finding a new brand on the diversified political spectrum that characterizes many democracies in the 2020s will be a difficult task. However, the rethinking of social democracy is an ongoing process.[76]

Democracy — a Means of Overcoming Capitalism or Embedding Capitalism?

The relationship between social democracy, democracy and capitalism has been a difficult and tension-ridden one from the nineteenth century to the present day. As I have argued here, the emergence of social democracy in the nineteenth century was closely

72 Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988).

73 Luke March, *Radical Left Parties in Europe* (London: Routledge, 2012).

74 Tijtske Akkerman, Sarah L. De Lange, and Matthijs Rooduijn, eds., *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: into the Mainstream?* (London: Routledge, 2016).

75 Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, eds., *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2004).

76 Richard Gillespie and William E. Paterson, eds., *Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe* (London: Routledge, 1993), which is about rethinking processes in light of the neoliberal challenge. See also: Henning Meyer and Jonathan Rutherford, eds., *The Future of Social Democracy: Building the Good Society* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).

associated with the struggle for democracy—political, economic, and social. Frustrated and disappointed by the failure of bourgeois society to integrate social democracy and enraged by multiple forms of discrimination and persecution, many social democrats turned to revolutionary Marxism during the last third of the nineteenth century. This was accompanied by a denigration of democracy within the ranks of social democracy. From being the crucial aim, it became a mere means to achieve a more socially just society. The tensions between socialism and democracy were written into Marxism and could not be overcome within Marxism. When the social democratic movement split into a social democratic and a communist wing following the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, social democracy re-affirmed its belief in democracy and made this the major dividing line between itself and communism. However, under the impact of the Great Depression and the rise of fascism in interwar Europe, many social democrats remained ambiguous about democracy. Hence it was only after the end of the Second World War and under the impact of the Cold War that social democrats in the west abandoned Marxism and whole-heartedly endorsed liberal democracy and the rule of law as the framework in which to aim for and achieve greater social justice. Democracy was no longer a means to overcome capitalism. Instead, it became a tool with which to give capitalism a more human face, or in Karl Polanyi's memorable phrase, with which to "embed" capitalism.[77] During the golden age of social democracy from the 1950s to the 1970s, it combined a firm commitment to democracy with macro-economic steering, social engineering and a range of social and welfare policies all aimed at the more just redistribution of societal wealth. However, the attacks of neoliberalism on the one hand and of a postmaterial left on the other left the social democratic project looking increasingly outdated. It seemed no longer to provide appropriate answers to the economic and environmental challenges of contemporary societies. Torn between sticking to old recipes, a neoliberalization of its outlook and a "greening" of its traditions, it has been seeking to reinvent itself with varying success from the 1990s onwards.[78]

If, arguably, many of its central presuppositions have been looking old-fashioned, including statism, macro-economic steering, and social engineering, the one plank of its long history, democracy, is arguably still its strongest arrow, albeit one that a variety of other political groupings also lay claim to. Nevertheless, if we survey some of the more recent ideas by left-wing intellectuals on how to rejuvenate the social democratic project in the twenty-first century, ideas of democracy tend to take centre stage. Jürgen Habermas has called on social democracy to rethink its project by re-affirming

77 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) [first published in 1944].

78 Hans Keman, *Social Democracy: A Comparative Account of the Left-Wing Party Family* (London: Routledge, 2017).

its commitment to liberal democracy. This would involve stressing the importance of liberal freedoms, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Institutions, according to Habermas, become central elements in upholding a precarious balance of interests in democratically constituted societies.[79] Among the sharpest critics of Habermas on the left have been Chantal Mouffe and Ernestau Laclau but their notions of "radical democracy" also advise the left to use, above all, the mobilization of a democratically constituted civil society to counter neoliberalism's attacks on democracy.[80] Oskar Negt has argued explicitly that in response to neoliberalism social democracy should engage in a public debate on the relationship between socialism and democracy to overcome the identity crisis on the left of the political spectrum.[81] Norberto Bobbio has called on the left to revive ideas of economic democracy and the democratization of the economic sphere in order to counter the power of corporate capitalism. The major dividing line in society, for him, is still that of social inequality, social injustice and poverty, and democracy remains the only way for the left to search for more social justice.[82] The extension of democracy to more social spheres than the political is also at the heart of Anthony Giddens' programme of a revitalization of the left. Arguing that "socialism is closely tied up with ideals of democracy," he finds: "Democracy offers a framework within which socialist parties can peacefully rise to power and implement their programme of change."[83] The ultimate aim of achieving more social cohesion in societies can only be achieved through democratic means. A democratized democracy, according to Giddens, needs decentralization of political decision-making, more local direct democracy and a more active citizens' involvement in governance structures.[84] The worrying analyses of Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, who have diagnosed the emergence of a self-referential post-democracy of elites and the increasing move of important political, economic and social decisions outside of spheres of democrat-

79 Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

80 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985). More recently, Mouffe has chastised social democracy for having become neoliberalized and has called for a left-wing populism re-invigorating the democratic political process through agonistic principles. See Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013); Mouffe, *For a Left Populism* (London: Verso, 2018).

81 Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig: politische Intellektuelle und die Macht* (Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp, 1998), 166.

82 Norberto Bobbio, *Which Socialism? Marxism, Socialism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); Bobbio, *Left and Right* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).

83 Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 62.

84 Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

ic control,[85] seem to make it all the more necessary to emphasize the importance of democracy for the social democratic project. Capitalism has to be democratically controlled and social democracy, with its long commitment to democracy, would be well advised to put itself at the helm of a movement demanding more democratic control of capitalism.

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85 Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (Blackwell: Wiley, 2004); Wolfgang Streeck, *How Will Capitalism End?* (London: Verso, 2016). See also Wolfgang Streeck, *Gekaufte Zeit: die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp, 2013).